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Empirical Environmental
Scholarship
Robert L. Fischman* and Lydia Barbash-Riley**
The most important development in legal scholarship over the past quarter
century has been the rise of empirical research. Drawing upon the traditions of
legal realism and the law and economics movement, a variety of social science
techniques have delivered fresh perspectives and punctured false claims. But
environmental law has been slow to adopt empirical tools, and our findings
indicate that it lags behind other fields. There are several clear benefits from
an empirical agenda to explore how to make environmental law more effective.
But no previous article has applied the lessons from empirical scholarship in
other fields to environmental law. This Article fills that gap by assessing the
state of environmental empirical scholarship, evaluating the strengths and
weaknesses of published approaches to answering empirical questions, and
recommending methods to advance the empirical research agenda.
Where environmental law scholarship has employed empiricism, it has
done so mostly in the pollution control area. More empirical environmental law
research relies on analysis of existing data than on the generation of new data,
and experimental treatments are completely absent from our review of the
literature. One strength of the empirical work in environmental law is
analyzing existing data to determine correlations using regression analysis and
statistics. But empirical environmental law scholarship underperforms in
offering policy prescriptions. This assessment of the field identifies several
methods and sources of data that may prove useful in advancing and
sharpening empiricism’s contribution to law reform and implementation.
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INTRODUCTION
The most important development in legal scholarship over the past quarter
century has been the rise of empirical research. Drawing upon the traditions of
legal realism and the law and economics movement, a variety of social science
techniques have delivered fresh perspectives and punctured false claims.1
Environmental law, while not immune from the trend of increasing
contributions from empirical research, nonetheless seldom incorporates insights
from empirical investigations.2 An empirical agenda could facilitate reforms to
improve environmental law’s effectiveness. However, no previous article has
applied the lessons from empirical scholarship in other fields to environmental

1. Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools,
81 IND. L.J. 141, 144–46 (2006) (describing the roots of empirical legal scholarship in legal realism and
law and economics). For an example of an empirical study puncturing false claims, see Victor D.
Quintanilla & Cheryl R. Kaiser, The Same-Actor Inference of Nondiscrimination: Moral Credentialing
and the Psychological and Legal Licensing of Bias, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1, 68–70 (2016) (questioning the
rationale of the “same-actor” doctrine using psychological science and empirical data on implicit bias).
2. See infra Part III, accompanying notes 120–122.
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law.3 This Article fills that gap by assessing the state of empirical
environmental scholarship, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of
published approaches to answering empirical questions, and recommending
methods to advance the empirical environmental law research agenda.
Some commentators estimate that empirical methods now appear in about
half of all articles published in legal journals.4 But environmental law has been
slow to adopt empirical tools, and our findings indicate that it lags behind other
fields.5 Where environmental law scholarship has employed empiricism, it has
done so mostly in the pollution control area.6 More empirical environmental
law research relies on analysis of existing data than on the generation of new
data, and experimental treatments are completely absent from our review of the
literature.7 One strength of the empirical work in environmental law is mining
existing data to determine correlations using regression analysis and statistics.
However, empirical environmental law scholarship underperforms in offering
concrete policy prescriptions. This assessment identifies several methods and
data sources that may prove useful in advancing and sharpening empiricism’s
contribution to environmental law reform and implementation.
Part I of this Article reviews the rise of empirical research in legal
scholarship and circumscribes the domains of both empirical research and
environmental law that we explore in this study. Part II discusses our method of
review of environmental law scholarship, explains how we coded articles, and
summarizes our results. We illustrate some of the difficult coding judgments
we made in probing the empirical dimensions of the literature. Part III explains
the significance of our findings with special attention to how environmental
law might make better use of empirical methods. It describes empirical
research’s contributions to positive law and how the articles we reviewed
interrogated existing data. Part III also discusses the challenge and promise of
generating new datasets and policy recommendations. We conclude that the
relative paucity of empirical research in environmental law, while not an
inherent shortcoming in the field, nonetheless points to some promising areas
of new research. A greater emphasis on quantified, systematic observations in
environmental law research can better direct scarce resources toward more
effective human health protection and ecological sustainability.
3. Other authors have highlighted the need to expand environmental legal scholarship beyond “a
reliance on jurisprudential theories of ‘legal principles’” in order to promote maturation of the field.
Elizabeth Fisher et al., Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law
Scholarship, 21 J. ENVTL. L. 213, 245 (2009).
4. Shari Seidman Diamond & Pam Mueller, Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law Reviews, 6
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 581, 586, 591 (2010).
5. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in
Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 83–85 (2003) (lamenting the lack of
empirical research examining the role of norms in compliance with environmental laws despite bodies of
research on compliance in other areas, such as tax law).
6. See infra Table 2.
7. See infra Table 5.
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I. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP
Scholars have not settled on a single definition of empirical legal
scholarship. Most researchers introduce their discussion of empiricism with
their own definitions, which generally share a commitment to some form of the
Greek root of the word, empeirikos, meaning experience.8 American legal
empiricism can be traced through the towering influence of Oliver Wendell
Holmes’ critique of formalism: “The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience.”9 Some modern scholars emphasize the role of empirical
research in testing a falsifiable hypothesis through the use of statistical
techniques.10 This narrow definition of empirical research is modeled on the
natural science paradigm of hypothesis testing through controlled experiments.
However, most definitions encompass a broader scope by emphasizing the core
idea of observation at the heart of empiricism. For instance, in their influential
article, Professors Lee Epstein and Gary King argue that “[w]hat makes
research empirical is that it is based on observations of the world—in other
words, data, which is just a term for facts about the world.”11 Under this
definition, most legal scholarship other than theory would be empirical.
For the purposes of this Article, we focus on the systematic and
quantitative dimensions of empirical legal studies. Positive observations about
judicial opinions and statutes have been a staple of environmental law since its
very beginnings, and do not serve to distinguish newer empirical techniques in
the law journals.12 The rise of online databases in the 1980s, especially
Westlaw and Lexis, ushered in an era of comprehensive computer searching
that yielded many articles examining a wide range of attributes of judicial
decisions and statutes.13 This work continues today, but it does not reflect the
8. Empiric, SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2002).
9. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). John Dewey’s influential work
in the social sciences also promoted the notion that effective research could view policies as hypotheses
in application of the scientific method. See generally JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY
(1938).
10. See, e.g., George, supra note 1, at 146 (“[Empirical legal] scholars, unlike doctrinalists, take a
primarily positive approach and utilize the scientific method to evaluate the relevant evidence.”);
Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision
Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 821 (2002) (“[W]hen I speak of empirical
legal scholarship I refer only to the subset of empirical legal scholarship that uses statistical techniques
and analyses.”).
11. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002).
12. This need to distinguish empirical techniques is central to the definitions excluding doctrinal
analysis from most reviews of empirical law scholarship. E.g., Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship
in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2002) (arguing that despite
an expansive conception of empiricism in theory, distinguishing empirical techniques from traditional,
doctrinal scholarship requires a narrower definition that excludes articles studying a small number of
judicial opinions anecdotally).
13. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1721 (1997) (compiling 250 challenges to EPA decisions decided by the D.C. Circuit
through Lexis and Westlaw); see also Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of
Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219,
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more recent developments in legal scholarship that employ different databases,
experimental approaches, and statistical and regression analysis. A useful
review of the recent wave of empirical research in environmental law should
recognize the longer tradition of doctrinal scholarship, but focus on how the
newer applications of the empirical method contribute to understanding
environmental law.
While we seek to distinguish empirical analysis from traditional doctrinal
research, circumscribing our study domain to explicit hypothesis testing would
exclude many important new lines of research that point the way toward more
effective use of empiricism. We adopt a middle ground also to limit our
analysis to a manageable number of articles. Professor Shari Diamond’s 2002
definition of empirical research yields an optimal scope for our purposes:
“[T]he systematic organization of a series of observations with the method of
data collection and analysis made available to the audience.”14 The focus on
systematic organization embraces a variety of coding exercises that can yield
insights into the elements of legal actions and environmental outcomes, a
common variety of contemporary approaches to environmental law
scholarship.15 Yet, it excludes the vast majority of doctrinal articles that make
anecdotal observations about the legal world without systematic collection or
quantitative analysis. Doctrinal research remains the lifeblood of legal
scholarship and serves as the baseline against which we measure the rise of
empiricism.
Identifying a useful definition of empirical scholarship only gets us
halfway to our aim. We also need to delimit the scope of environmental law, a
field with a notoriously fuzzy boundary.16 We aimed to capture a broad array
of empirical research about the relationship between legal tools, such as
liability and regulation, and actual environmental quality. Therefore, we did not
restrict our study to articles about environmental law statutes or judicial
decisions. Instead, we employed a relatively expansive definition:

1221 & n.15 (1984) (evaluating the Court’s use of the term “public forum” through cases turned up in a
Westlaw search); Christopher D. Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149, 1152 (1981)
(attributing the decline in the importance of treatise-writing in legal scholarship to, in part, the rise of
Lexis and Westlaw).
14. Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, and
Plankton, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 803, 805 (2002).
15. See, e.g., Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and
Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 354–64 (2010)
(comparing the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) recovery priority rankings between animals listed by
FWS’s own initiative and animals listed only after a petition).
16. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, What is Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 717,
719 (2007) (arguing that natural resources law is more than merely an advanced topic in property or
environmental law); A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 213, 217–18 (2004) (“[W]hen one sums up . . . [what] make[s] up the core of what most
people consider environmental law, one is hard pressed to reduce them to a set of distinctive,
fundamental principles, let alone rules that can be applied to a wide range of current and future
issues . . . .”).
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environmental law research analyzes any legal issue focused on pollution,
species or habitat conservation, land use, natural resource management, or
climate change. Therefore, our definition includes less traditional
environmental law topics, such as an examination of the effects of
performance-based renewable energy policies under the 2007 Energy
Independence and Security Act on biofuel production, food prices, and
greenhouse gas emissions.17 Our scope excludes articles using decision-making
tools applied in environmental law, such as cost-benefit analysis, when the
articles address environmental consequences only tangentially.18 As with other
efforts to define whether articles qualify as environmental law scholarship, our
method is “more of an art than a science.”19
Our study excludes the vast domains of public health, epidemiology,
conservation biology, and other related fields where empirical studies are often
relevant to a legal question. Including literature that is relevant but that is not
law scholarship itself would swamp the relatively small numbers of law
articles.20 Even law professors contribute to nonlegal journals that address the
effectiveness of law.21 However, those articles tend to have little legal analysis.
To avoid wading into the debate about what constitutes an ever-expanding
universe of legal scholarship itself, we narrowed this study’s domain by
searching only journals closely affiliated with law schools and legal
organizations.22 The proxy of law-related publishers of journals to indicate
legal scholarship is weak. Some articles meeting our criteria for environmental
law have minimal connection to legal analysis.23 However, law journals are
more attentive to the importance of legal analysis and linking empirical results
to existing legal scholarship. Law journals remain a fair representation of the
expansion of the scope of scholarship published by law professors, which has

17. See, e.g., Madhu Khanna et al., Land Use and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Effects of Biofuel
Policies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 549, 549–50 (2011).
18. See, e.g., John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J.
1603, 1633 (2013) (comparing well-being analysis to cost-benefit analysis as applied to EPA’s
regulation of pulp and paper production).
19. Linda K. Breggin et al., Trends in Environmental Law Scholarship 2008–2015, 46 ENVTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,647, 10,647 (2016); see also Fisher et al., supra note 3, at 219–20 (describing
the “intellectual incoherence” of environmental law scholarship).
20. See generally Kenneth Chay et al., The Clean Air Act of 1970 and Adult Mortality, 27 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 279 (2003) (an example of an empirical study of an environmental issue that is nonlaw scholarship).
21. See Robert L. Fischman & J.B. Ruhl, Judging Adaptive Management Practices of U.S.
Agencies, 30 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 268, 268 (2016); Martin F.J. Taylor, Kieran F. Suckling &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act: A Quantitative Analysis, 55
BIOSCIENCE 360, 360 (2005).
22. Some non-law-school legal organizations publish influential journals, such as Environmental
Law Reporter News & Analysis, published by the Environmental Law Institute.
23. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem: Lessons from
the Rise and Fall of EPA’s “Flagship” Voluntary Program, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 81–86 (2014)
(engaging in quantitative analysis of Performance Track, one of EPA’s main voluntary programs, but
not engaging in legal analysis).
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broadened in the past two decades with the rise of faculty who have earned
research degrees in the social sciences. Though changing, academia still
regards law journal publication as the premier showcase for recognizing
contributions to legal scholarship.
II. METHOD, CODING, AND RESULTS
We reviewed empirical environmental law studies published in U.S. law
journals as of January 1, 2017. Seventy-three of the 2400 articles we reviewed
fell within the scope of our definitions of both empirical and environmental law
research. We searched in the Westlaw database “JLR” of law reviews and
journals using two primary search strings with limiting criteria: [adv:
TE(environment! & data! & method! & analys!)], search within results for
[“Table 1*” OR “Table I*” AND ATLEAST2(empiric!); and
(TE(environment!) & TI(empirical))]. This method produced sixty-six of the
articles we ultimately included. We also searched the archives of the Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies (not available on Westlaw) for all articles containing
the terms “environment” and “environmental,” which produced three relevant
articles. Finally, to estimate the range of articles a researcher conducting an
exploratory investigation into empirical environmental law studies might
encounter, we searched Westlaw for: [adv: empirical & “environmental law”]
and reviewed the first 100 articles. This resulted in four additional relevant
articles that did not appear using the other search terms. Therefore, our search
for empirical environmental law articles yielded seventy-three pieces reported
in this study.
The search method errs on the side of undercounting empirical
environmental law articles in order to review scholarship both self-identifying
as empirical and representing more quantitatively sophisticated research
methods. For instance, adaptive management has emerged over the past decade
as an important legal issue. In particular, courts grapple with the discontinuities
between legislative requirements and best management practices.24 More
broadly, adjustment to climate change across legal silos has led to a growing
body of literature on resilience and adaptive governance.25 Nonetheless, our
search failed to unveil some relevant case study research because it did not
employ the terms or methods commonly associated with systematic
organization of observations.26 Finally, and most importantly, our method
24. See J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV.
424, 444–48 (2010).
25. See Tracy-Lynn Humby, Law and Resilience: Mapping the Literature, 4 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L.
85, 99–104 (2014) (surveying the literature on law and resilience).
26. For instance, our search failed to find any of the adaptive management articles Humby
categorized as “strongly empirical,” meaning they employed “a case study methodology, i.e. an indepth, multi-dimensional exploration of a particular case or cases.” Id. at 101. Two examples of this
category of scholarship not included in our research are Barbara Cosens, Resilience and Law as a
Theoretical Backdrop for Natural Resource Management: Flood Management in the Columbia River
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employed a coarse filter that relied on authors to self-identify their research as
empirical. Therefore, some articles that employed empirical techniques but did
not identify them as such fell outside our scope.27 This is a particular problem
for a field with weak empirical conventions, as scholars pursuing systematic,
quantitative research may fail to self-label their work as empirical. Nonetheless,
our parsimonious method has the advantage of allowing us to compare our
results with other studies of empirical legal scholarship, which generally
formulate search algorithms employing the same terms we do.28
For the seventy-three articles that met our criteria both for empirical and
environmental law scholarship, we coded several attributes. Table 1 shows the
publication dates for all articles employing empirical methods in environmental
law scholarship. Because environmental law accounts for relatively few
empirical articles, there is substantial annual variation in publishing. However,
it is clear that the most recent decade we canvassed, 2007 to 2016 (forty-five
articles),29 authors published twice as many empirical articles as in the decade
before, 1997 to 2006 (twenty-one articles). We collected other basic attributes
of those publications: specific law or doctrine at issue, data source, whether the
article engaged in hypothesis testing of a specific theory or solely in
exploratory analysis, and whether the article made a specific policy
recommendation. Subpart A covers most of the attributes we coded. Though
some, such as date, are self-explanatory, others require more description in
order to understand our coding. Subpart B addresses the framework we
developed to categorize different types of empirical research reported in the
legal literature.

Basin, 42 ENVTL. L. 241 (2012), and Sandra Zellmer & Lance Gunderson, Why Resilience May Not
Always be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades, 87
NEB. L. REV. 893 (2009).
27. See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the
U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993); Albert C. Lin,
Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the
Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996); Joel A. Mintz, “Neither the Best of Times Nor the Worst of
Times”: EPA Enforcement During the Clinton Administration, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,390 (2005) (evaluating enforcement performance through analysis of responses to a standard set of
interview questions). In at least one case, a relevant article that did self-identify as empirical nonetheless
failed our search criteria. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Noah by the Numbers: An Empirical Evaluation of
the Endangered Species Act, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 356 (1997) (reviewing CHARLES C. MANN & MARK
L. PLUMMER, NOAH’S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES (1995)).
28. See, e.g., Diamond & Mueller, supra note 4, at 585–88 (comparing the search algorithms
employed by their study and previous studies).
29. Many law journals did not complete publication of their 2016 volumes by the end of the
calendar year, so the number of empirical environmental law articles we counted in the second decade is
a minimum estimate.
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Table 1: Trend in Publication Dates of Empirical Environmental Law Articles.
This table shows the number of empirical environmental law articles published by
year, as of January 1, 2017.

Year
Before 1997
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Total

Number of Articles
6
5
4
1
1
2
0
2
2
3
1
3
8
2
5
5
6
3
8
2
3
73

A. Coding Basic Attributes
1. Specific Law or Doctrine Studied
Reflecting the prominence of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
statutes in environmental law scholarship, empirical environmental articles
examined pollution control legislation far more frequently than other laws.
Within the pollution control legislative category, the Clean Air Act, Clean
Water Act, and hazardous waste statutes each appeared in fifteen to twenty
empirical studies. The next most frequently cited law, the Endangered Species
Act (ESA), appeared in only five articles. Table 2 summarizes the laws studied
in the empirical environmental law scholarship we identified. Several articles
did not address specific laws and instead focused on institutional behaviors,
including the behavior of the judiciary, agencies, and private institutions.
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Table 2: Laws Studied. This table shows the numbers of articles, out of seventythree, that addressed different laws. Articles may address more than one law. Some
articles addressed issues, such as the judicial behavior, that do not address any
particular environmental law.

Law
Federal pollution control statutes
Endangered Species Act
National Environmental Policy Act
Federal public land statutes
Other federal statutes (e.g., tax,
energy)
Property and takings law
State environmental statutes
State water law

Number of Articles
33
5
4
4
4
3
3
2

2. Data Source
Conventional legal scholarship interprets governmental decisions as data
that reveal insights about the law. Court decisions traditionally dominated legal
scholarship, but environmental law matured in an era when scholars
increasingly turned to legislation and regulation to provide content for legal
analysis. We include as legal documents any record carrying some force of law
or embodying the decision of a government actor, such as an agency rule,
program, permit, analysis, or enforcement record. In coding the empirical
environmental law literature, we distinguished between legal documents and
other sources of information. Nonlegal sources of information often drive
environmental regulation initiatives. Table 3 shows that most nonlegal sources
of data describe demographic facts (e.g., community racial composition, per
capita income), economic information (e.g., prices), facility characteristics
(e.g., pollution emissions), and land and resource use (e.g., siting information).
Demographic information was the most common nonlegal data type employed
in the empirical research. For instance, environmental justice empirical studies
often employ census data to determine socioeconomic profiles of communities
affected by hazardous waste facilities.30 The empirical documentation showing
racial disparities in impact helped prompt the EPA to establish its office of
environmental justice in 1992.31 This line of environmental law research
represents perhaps the high point of empirical environmental law research
effectiveness in influencing administrative reform.
30. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Paul Mohai, Robin Saha & Beverly Wright, Toxic Wastes and
Race at Twenty: Why Race Still Matters After All of These Years, 38 ENVTL. L. 371, 372 (2008).
31. Id. at 380–81 (arguing that the empirical documentation alone would not have succeeded
without advocacy).
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Table 3: Nonlegal Data Sources Employed in Empirical Environmental
Law Scholarship. This table shows the numbers of articles (out of thirty-two coded
for Category B2) that employed each type of nonlegal data. Articles may employ
more than one type, so the numbers add up to more than thirty-two. Other types of
data employed in fewer than five articles, not counted in the table, include ambient
environmental conditions.

Type of Nonlegal Data
Demographic information

Number of Articles
18

(e.g., racial composition, per capita income)

Economic information

6

(e.g., profit, prices)

Facility characteristics

5

(e.g., facility type, pollution emissions)

Land and resource use

5

(e.g., zoning, siting)

The data sources for some articles did not fit cleanly into either category.
For example, Professors Eric Biber and Berry Brosi used data from the Fish
and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) ESA recovery priority ranking system to
challenge the assumption that public participation via listing petitions and
citizen suits misdirects agency resources.32 While the recovery priority
rankings are a type of government decision, the rankings are based on realworld data reported by the FWS that the authors also used in their analysis.33
We resolved this close call by coding the article in both the category for content
analysis of government documents and quantitative analysis of nonlegal data.
3. Distinguishing Hypothesis Testing from Exploratory Analysis
We sought to distinguish between hypothesis testing, on the one hand, and
descriptive or exploratory data analysis, on the other. Though there is no bright
line between the two, hypothesis testing is associated with widely accepted,
standard definitions and rules of analysis, such as “yes/no” triggers strictly
defined by crossing a particular threshold of significance. Hypothesis testing
requires all factors that impact the relevant outcome to be constant, so that the
treatment (e.g., application of a regulation) can be verified as an isolated
effect.34 Therefore, it is most closely associated with experimental design

32. Biber & Brosi, supra note 15, at 324–25.
33. Id. at 335 (“FWS’s recovery priority system ranks species according to (1) the degree to which
the species is threatened with extinction; (2) the ease with which the species could be recovered; (3) the
level of taxonomic uniqueness of a species; and (4) whether protection of the species would result in
conflict with economic development, in that order of priority.”).
34. Michael Greenstone & Ted Gayer, Quasi-Experimental and Experimental Approaches to
Environmental Economics, 54 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 21, 22 (2009).
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(Category A3) and quasi-experimental comparisons (Category B3).35
Exploratory analysis can be less formal—allowing for researchers to devise
their own statistical tests—and more descriptive. It is more about measuring
and less about testing. It is also nearly ubiquitous in empirical environmental
law. Unlike our methodological categories, our study did not allow multiple
coding for articles with exploratory analysis. If an article engaged in both
exploratory data analysis and hypothesis testing, we coded it for hypothesis
testing. We made this judgment even if the article’s primary thrust was
descriptive and only tangentially tested a hypothesis.36 Table 4 shows that 56
percent of the empirical environmental law articles employed hypothesis
testing. If the article engaged in hypothesis testing, we also coded whether the
authors use sophisticated statistical analysis such as multivariate regression or
other testing algorithms, or only drew conclusions from empirical evidence to
support or disprove a hypothesis. Where the articles did test hypotheses, most
of the articles simply relied on counts of data rather than statistical analysis.
Table 4: Hypothesis Testing and Policy Recommendations. This table shows the
number of articles that engaged in narrow hypothesis testing and that offered
specific policy recommendations, out of the seventy-three identified.

Attribute
Hypothesis testing
Policy recommendation
Hypothesis testing article that also
offered policy recommendation

Number of Articles
41
35
12

We counted articles as hypothesis testing only if the authors assessed the
validity of a theory by attempting to identify observable implications that the
researcher “would expect to detect in the real world if [their] theory is right.”37
Well-designed hypothesis testing also identifies evidence against the theory
being tested.38 We did not categorize as hypothesis testing those articles
engaging only in null hypothesis testing as part of a statistical test. Hypothesis
testing for the purposes of this research must be attached to a theory. The
authors must assess the validity of a theory by attempting to identify observable
implications that the researcher “would expect to detect in the real world if
[their] theory is right” and, ideally, by identifying evidence against the theory
being tested.39 Professor Kristen Engel’s State Environmental Standard35. See infra Part II.B for a detailed explanation of the categories.
36. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 35, 64 (2016) (conducting a descriptive, positive analysis of takings cases that
incidentally highlighted an inconsistency between the results and the Priest-Klein hypothesis that
lawyers settle cases in which outcomes appear certain).
37. Epstein & King, supra note 11, at 62.
38. Id. at 76.
39. Id. at 62.
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Setting: Is There a “Race” and is it “To the Bottom”? is a prime example of
research employing statistical techniques (though not ones that control for
confounding variables) to test an established hypothesis.40 Engel gathered
information from the existing literature, her own surveys of environmental
regulators, real-world economic indicators, and polluter location data to test the
classic “race-to-the-bottom” theory.41 The theory posits that federal
environmental standards need to establish a “floor” for regulation to prevent
states from competing to retain and attract industry through ever more lax
regulation. Engel combined multiple sources of data to produce an unusually
convincing argument supporting the theory, though the debate about how
generally the “race to the bottom” characterizes state behavior rages on twenty
years later.
We categorized articles that do not seek to determine the validity of a
narrowly drawn hypothesis as constituting exploratory data analysis.
Exploratory analysis is particularly important in many areas of environmental
law where broadly applicable theories have yet to be advanced. These articles
may embrace statistical techniques, but they did not attempt to test any
particular theory. Instead, they offer positive accounts of environmental law
that are often not apparent without systematic study. For example, Professor
Michael Vandenbergh studied agreements that private firms and other actors
entered into in response to public environmental law to analyze the influence of
these “second-order” agreements on the regulatory administrative state.42 Our
study applies an exploratory analysis to a coded dataset of articles to describe
the contours of empirical environmental law.
A 2007 update of a landmark 1987 report commissioned by the United
Church of Christ’s (UCC) Commission for Racial Justice illustrates the
difficulty we sometimes encountered in differentiating between hypothesis
testing and exploratory analysis.43 The authors essentially retested the UCC’s
1987 hypothesis on the relationship between siting environmental “bads” and
demographics, finding again that “[r]ace continues to be the predominant
explanatory factor in [hazardous waste] facility locations and clearly still
matters.”44 However, the stated purpose of the new research is to update the
UCC’s study using new census data, assess the progress of environmental
justice over the past twenty years, and make policy recommendations
accordingly. We categorized this research as an exploratory article because the
40. Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and is it “To the
Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 279–80 (1997).
41. Id. at 316.
42. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2034
(2005); cf. Amy L. Stein, Climate Change Under NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration of
Greenhouse Gases, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 473, 485–86 (2010) (analyzing the impacts of litigation by
environmental groups on “pressuring agencies to incorporate consideration of climate change into
NEPA documents”).
43. Bullard, Mohai, Saha & Wright, supra note 30.
44. Id. at 372.
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authors did not primarily aim to prove or disprove the UCC’s 1987 findings.
Our judgment on placing articles in different categories limits the replicability
of our study.
4. Policy Recommendations
We also tracked whether the articles included a recommendation for law
or policy changes based on empirical findings. We categorized articles as
offering policy recommendations only if they included suggestions for concrete
steps that lawmakers or administrators could take to advance a course of action
that the author’s research determined would be beneficial. Essentially, the study
had to include “some framework for connecting ‘is’ and ‘ought’” to link the
quantitative results with normative goals.45 For example, Engel engaged in a
detailed discussion of specific policy recommendations to overcome the
regulatory problem that she empirically verified.46 A 2013 study of invasive
plant regulation offered three specific actions that state legislatures should
consider: establish a formal role for science advisory councils, define the term
“invasive species” more precisely, and shift to a civil liability penalty regime to
punish the introduction of invasive species.47 Compared to other academic
fields, legal scholarship is distinctive in its demand for a “punch line,” the key
policy-relevant recommendation that emerges from the insights discovered in
the research. Therefore, it surprised us that 52 percent of the articles failed to
offer specific recommendations.48
Many empirical studies, even those testing hypotheses, stop short of
recommendations. For instance, Professors Michael Toffel and Jodi Short
tested “whether voluntary disclosure of self-detected compliance violations can
reliably indicate to regulators the presence of effective self-policing efforts that
might warrant a reduction in regulatory scrutiny of the disclosers.” 49 Their
research employed rigorous statistical methods, such as multivariate regression,
and a combination of real-world environmental and government intervention
data to advance a literature that had been “criticized for being ‘noncommittal
on the question of whether voluntary disclosure policies are worthwhile
complements to conventional enforcement strategies,’” as well as to evaluate
predictions of previous articles about self-policing’s deterrent effects.50 The

45. Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 117, 120 (2013).
46. Engel, supra note 40, at 369–74.
47. James S. Neal McCubbins, A. Bryan Endres, Lauren Quinn & Jacob N. Barney, Frayed Seams
in the “Patchwork Quilt” of American Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of Invasive Plant Species
Regulation, 43 ENVTL. L. 35, 74–76 (2013).
48. See infra Part III.D for our speculations on the cause of this result.
49. Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary SelfReporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 609, 611 (2011).
50. Id. at 638. Toffel and Short’s article is also an example of an article that tests an established
theory using rigorous statistics.
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authors suggest that self-policing could be a viable regulatory alternative, but
recommend further research instead of suggesting any specific regulatory
changes.51 Therefore, our narrow standard precluded counting the article as
having a policy recommendation.
B. Coding Categories of Empirical Environmental Research
We modified Professors Michelle Mello and Kathryn Zeiler’s 2008
framework for distinguishing among six different categories of empirical
research.52 Our typology focuses on both the kind of data analyzed and the
empirical method employed in the research.53 Our categories are not exclusive,
and many articles displayed more than one category of empirical environmental
law. There is a clear dichotomy between articles that generate new data
(Category A) and those that analyze existing data (Category B). Within the two
categories of data, however, the boundaries between methods are often fuzzy.
Among the articles generating new data, we distinguish among case studies
(Category A1), surveys or interviews (Category A2), and experimental designs
(Category A3). Where case studies supplement public information with data
from interviews, we coded them as both A1 and A2.54
Empirical environmental law scholarship uses methods of generating new
data less often than methods analyzing existing data. Among the articles
analyzing existing data, we distinguish among coding content of governmental
documents (Category B1), quantitative analysis of existing data, generally from
outside legal documents (Category B2), and controlled observational or quasiexperimental comparisons (Category B3). While the sources of data vary
considerably in the existing data category, we found that coding content of
documents (Category B1) in law journals always involved some kind of
governmental decisions. Conversely, quantitative analysis (Category B2) of
existing data generally involved sources from outside of legal documents,
51. Id. at 640.
52. Michelle M. Mello & Kathryn Zeiler, Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of the
Field, 96 GEO. L.J. 649, 651–52 (2008) (describing two components of empirical scholarship: 1)
utilization of data, and 2) employment of the scientific method). We also considered using Diamond and
Mueller’s one-through-four scale of empirical content (which incorporates Diamond’s 2002 definition)
and Humby’s strong empirical/weak empirical dichotomy, but found that these approaches did not
adequately capture the diversity of empirical environmental law studies. Diamond & Mueller, supra
note 4, at 586 (categorizing articles along a single continuum by extent of original empirical work);
Humby, supra note 25, at 101 (simply distinguishing between “weak empirical” and “strong empirical”
research).
53. Cf. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1038 (discussing two dimensions: source of data and main
purpose of investigation). Though the type of analysis will generally emerge from the purpose of
investigation, we believe coding for the analysis type is a more replicable approach, with fewer
inferences, than identifying the purpose of investigation.
54. See David S. Caudill & Donald E. Curley, Strategic Idealizations of Science to Oppose
Environmental Regulation: A Case Study of Five TMDL Controversies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 251, 254
(2009) (supplementing their documentation related to five Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) with
interviews with EPA and Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection officials).
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though they were often generated through governmental requirements, such as
effluent monitoring under Clean Water Act permits.55
Table 5: The Six Categories of Empirical Environmental Law Scholarship.
This table shows the number of articles in each category of empirical legal
scholarship out of the seventy-three identified.

Method
1
2
3

Category A
Generate New Data
Case study
11
Survey or interview
19
Experimental design
0

Category B
Use Existing Data
Government document coding
34
Nonlegal data
32
Quasi-experimental techniques
38

Table 5 summarizes our six categories. Many studies included more than
one methodological approach. We adopted an inclusive approach to coding
articles for the categories of empirical research—when in doubt about whether
an article fit in a category, we coded affirmatively. Therefore, our findings err
on the side of over-counting the variety of empirical work performed in each of
the articles. Category B3 articles were the most common (thirty-eight of
seventy-three), closely followed by Category B1 (thirty-four out of seventythree) and Category B2 (thirty-two out of seventy-three). The following
sections describe each empirical category and highlight articles that exemplify
the category or illustrate its outer boundaries.
As a preliminary note, our categories do not differ in their rigor, which is
related to trustworthiness of an empirical method in a variety of applications.
One empirical method may have great rigor for a particular purpose but not
another. For example, quantitative methods are often associated with rigor
because they lend themselves to statistically robust tests. However, though
quantitative methods may reduce complex case studies to statistically amenable
coding, they may overlook the messier dynamics that tell a richer story about
how the law operates.56 Above all, it is important to recognize empirical
research as instrumental. It is an approach to better understand some question
about the law. Different questions demand different empirical methods of
investigation. For instance, content analysis coding may better suit hypothesis

55. See Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, The Comparative Effectiveness of
Government Interventions on Environmental Performance in the Chemical Industry, 26 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 317, 323–26 (2007).
56. Sergio Puig, Does Bureaucratic Inertia Matter in Treaty Bargaining? Or, Toward a Greater
Use of Qualitative Data in Empirical Legal Inquiries, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 317,
320 (2013). Some scholars employed the analytical narrative approach drawing on game theory to help
generate the richer narrative. See ROBERT H. BATES ET AL., ANALYTIC NARRATIVES 3 (1998).
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testing than exploratory analysis.57 We do not intend our categorical divisions
to imply a judgment on the relative quality or usefulness of the research.
1. Category A1: Case Studies
Case studies examine a particular facet of environmental law through the
intensive analysis of one or several illustrative situations. Qualitative case
studies are the paradigm of doctrinal research. To qualify as empirical research
for our purposes, these articles must attempt to measure the impacts of
environmental law and policy in quantifiable ways, even if the sample size is
small. Most of the articles in this category mix the quantitative accounts with
deeper qualitative descriptions. Several studies, including the earliest empirical
environmental law article by fourteen years,58 conducted site-specific case
studies of environmental decision making about pollution control and resource
use.59 Case studies may be mere positive descriptions of environmental law in
action. Nevertheless, they often deploy empirical methods to critical effect. For
instance, the earliest article carefully documented the cost-benefit analysis used
by the Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Study to propose pollution control
measures to the Delaware River Basin Commission.60 The authors were able to
dig behind the information released by public agencies to link compliance costs
with waste-load data. They also learned about the pollution control standardsetting process through interviews with people representing the commission,
polluters, and cities.61 Combining Categories A1, A2, and B2, they concluded
that the pollution standard-setting exercise revealed the limits of cost-benefit
analysis in honestly grappling with fundamental questions about environmental
quality.62
Four out of seven of the empirical articles on environmental justice
included or focused entirely on case studies. The environmental racism theory
posits that people bear unequal environmental risks based on race. Both
proponents and critics of the theory found support in case studies. For example,
Thomas Lambert and Christopher Boerner investigated the siting of hazardous
waste sites in St. Louis and disputed the environmental racism hypotheses.63
57. John B. Gates, Content Analysis: Possibilities and Limits for Qualitative Data, 73
JUDICATURE 202, 203 (1990).
58. Bruce A. Ackerman et al., The Uncertain Search for Environmental Policy: The Costs and
Benefits of Controlling Pollution Along the Delaware River, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (1973).
59. See, e.g., Fred O. Boadu et al., An Empirical Investigation of Institutional Change in
Groundwater Management in Texas: The Edwards Aquifer Case, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117, 119
(2007) (analyzing a case study of the change in water appropriation rules in the Edwards Aquifer from a
rule of capture to a permit system); Caudill & Curley, supra note 54, at 253–54 (analyzing a case study
of disputes surrounding five TMDLs issued to pollutant dischargers in Philadelphia).
60. Ackerman et al., supra note 58.
61. Id. at 1247.
62. Id. at 1290.
63. Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes,
Economic Solutions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 195, 203–04 (1997).
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They found “no significant difference in poverty rates and percentages of
minority residents between census tracts with active [waste] facilities” and
those without, and weak evidence of a difference when inactive hazardous
waste facilities were included in the study.64 Racial disparities across census
tracts only became noticeable when significant disparities in housing values
were already present. The authors concluded that low housing values caused by
existing environmental problems attracted minority and poor residents to move
in and white residents to leave, “as opposed to the contrary causation
assumptions made by environmental discrimination theorists.”65 That same
year, Marie Kirk and Christine Wade analyzed the flow of tax revenue from
hazardous waste facilities in three California communities and found that the
low-income communities of color harmed by hazardous waste saw little benefit
from the revenues.66 The environmental justice articles also illustrate how
development of case studies often employs some existing data. As Table 6
illustrates, more than half of Category A1 publications also employ research
methods from Category B2.67
Table 6: Co-occurrence of Categories of Empirical Environmental
Law Articles. This table shows the number of articles in each category of
empirical legal scholarship that also meet the criteria for another category, out of
the seventy-three identified.

A1

A2

A3

B1

A2

4

A3

0

0

B1

1

5

0

B2

6

7

0

7

B3

3

9

0

14

B2

B3

21

64. Id. at 203.
65. Id. at 204.
66. Marie A. Kirk & Christine L. Wade, A Taxing Problem for Environmental Justice: The Tax
Money from Hazardous Waste Facilities, Where It Goes, and What It Means, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 201,
203–04 (1997).
67. See supra Part II.B.1.
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2. Category A2: Survey and Interview Data
These articles included data from surveys or interviews conducted by the
authors, and were the only examples of authors conducting field research of
their own instead of relying on data collected by others. Though such surveys
may be considered a kind of experiment,68 we separated them from more
conventional experimental designs that randomize treatments. Professor Sally
Simpson et al.’s study of corporate environmental crime control strategies
exemplifies the core of Category A2: a study based entirely on an authordesigned and administered survey.69 Recognizing that official data sources
cannot possibly include undiscovered crimes or managers’ thought processes,
the authors constructed a factorial survey70 to compare the effects of commandand-control versus self-regulation crime control strategies on managerial
decision making.71 The authors found that, for this group of respondents, the
threat of both types of strategies were nearly as effective, but did not
“substantially lessen the powerful influence of career benefits on offending
intentions.”72
Table 6 shows that several articles coded in Category A2 employ surveys
to supplement systematic content analysis of government documents or some
other research approach.73 For example, Professor Dave Owen reported on
semi-structured interviews to gather qualitative data from federal agency
employees74 on their impression of the effects of critical habitat designation on
the outcome of ESA biological opinions.75 The interview data served to round
out the conclusions Owen drew from his analysis of over four thousand
biological opinions (a Category B1 method—Coding Government Decisions).
However, they did not constitute the core dataset on which the article is based,
unlike other Category A2 articles.

68. Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 173, 226–31 (2013).
69. Sally S. Simpson et al., An Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime-Control
Strategies, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 242–44 (2013).
70. Id. The authors explain that:
Factorial surveys combine experimentally manipulated hypothetical scenarios (vignettes)
with survey questions to measure respondents’ intentions, decisions, attitudes, or judgments.
These designs, unlike more traditional survey techniques, allow researchers to manipulate a
full range of circumstances that may affect a decision—essentially taking into account the
complexity and richness in the way people approach decisions and evaluations.
Id. at 242 (internal quotations and citations removed).
71. Id. at 234.
72. Id. at 263 (“[F]or every unit increase in sanction risk, the odds of being willing to offend
decrease by 43% for formal sanctions and 51% for informal sanctions.”).
73. See supra Part II.B.1.
74. Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV.
141, 163, 173 (2012).
75. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2012) (designation of critical habitat); id. § 1536(b)
(biological opinions).
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3. Category A3: Experimental Design
Experimental designs use randomized treatments on study participants to
assess policy interventions while minimizing the impact of confounding
variables more than can be achieved with multivariate regression analysis
alone.76 The random treatment element seeks to reduce selection bias. The best
experiments involve people, places, or situations where the treatment and the
control groups are as identical as possible except for the treatment itself. Thus,
any differences in outcomes can be credited to the treatment.77
Experimental designs are the paradigm of the scientific method for testing
hypotheses about causation. Mello and Zeiler call this form of empirical
research the “gold standard.”78 Other scholars note that deductive
argumentation in law makes field observation more useful, which may explain
why we encountered no articles in this category. In fact, as with all methods,
experiments bring both advantages and disadvantages to the problem of testing
theories.79 The chief advantage is the control of extraneous factors to
selectively separate different possible explanations for results. Experiments are
also more likely to be replicable. On the other hand, laboratory conditions
never completely mirror the real world. A theory confirmed in a laboratory may
not explain reality.80
Some legal fields embracing empirical methods have tested many theories
about how the law works.81 However, these methods are a poor fit for most
research in environmental law, which defies laboratory study. Studying
environmental law is more like studying ecology: researchers have to observe
effects in situ, embedded in the messy realities of the world where interventions
are seldom random. Still, some of the experimental research published in law
journals, while not expressly connected to an environmental law problem (and
thus outside of the scope of our study), does offer useful lessons for
environmental law. For instance, Professor Jeremy Blumenthal’s experiments
on group deliberation and the endowment effect could be adapted to
environmental law issues.82 Such experiments would contribute to our
76. See Mello & Zeiler, supra note 52, at 660; see also Donald P. Green & Dane R. Thorley, Field
Experimentation and the Study of Law and Policy, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 53, 54 (2014)
(examining the growth of experimental field studies in a variety of legal domains).
77. Greenstone & Gayer, supra note 34, at 27.
78. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 52, at 660. Other researchers point to the artifacts of experimental
approaches, such as the use of homogeneous subjects of college students, as a basis to prefer nonexperimental empirical approaches.
79. See Rachel Croson, Why and How to Experiment: Methodologies from Experimental
Economics, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 921, 922 (2002).
80. Id. at 922–23.
81. See, e.g., Jean Braucher et al., Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 393, 393–97 (2012) (discussing studies finding that attorneys play a key role in
chapter choice and that they tend to guide African Americans disproportionately toward one particular
choice).
82. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Group Deliberation and the Endowment Effect: An Experimental
Study, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 41 (2012).
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understanding of the limits of contingent valuation in environmental impact
analysis and cost-benefit balancing. Therefore, we included experimental
design as a plausible category for empirical environmental law methods that
generate new data. If we had not carved out a special category for interviews
and surveys, many articles currently coded Category A2 would have qualified
as employing experimental designs.
While no articles included in our study met the randomization
requirement, Vandenbergh’s “conceptual framework that accounts for the
influence of norms on environmental decision-making” could be adapted by
future researchers into a replicable experimental framework.83 For instance,
Vandenberg discusses how testable hypotheses about the deterrence effects of
various internal norms could be verified or disproved through behavior
psychology experiments.84 In general, the intersection of law and psychology
lends itself to exploration through experimental design,85 though the literature
underrepresents environmental law. Cognitive and social psychology have
already offered important frameworks for discovering how people perceive and
decide environmental conflicts.86 Experimental, behavioral economics also
offers many model studies that can be adapted for environmental law reform.87
Finally, though less common to legal scholarship than economics, methods
from other social sciences have productively unmasked the assumptions of
economic approaches to data methods.88 Legal scholars have a wealth of
options in designing new experimental approaches to better understand how
people project meaning onto the environment.
4. Category B1: Coding Government Decisions
Category B1 studies share two characteristics: 1) the authors analyze and
code the content of all or a large random sample of cases or other government
decisions on a particular subject matter, and 2) the authors draw “inferences
based on both [this] thematic analysis and frequency counts of various
[decision] characteristics.”89 Characteristic of studies that generate data through

83. Vandenbergh, supra note 5, at 57.
84. Id. at 141, 143. Vandenbergh subsequently coauthored a study that undertook a test of his
norms hypothesis though surveys. Simpson et al., supra note 69.
85. See, e.g., Quintanilla & Kaiser, supra note 1 (discussing how psychological experiments have
disproved the basis for the “same-actor” inference in federal common law).
86. See, e.g., PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 1–6 (2000) (comparing utility theory to
bounded rationality and how they affect individuals’ perceptions of the risk of extreme natural events).
87. E.g., Fredrik Carlsson & Olof Johansson-Stenman, Behavioral Economics and Environmental
Policy, 4 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 75, 93 (2012) (discussing how behavior economics can advance
environmental resource economics); cf. Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law
and Economics: An Introduction, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1002–03 (1985) (introducing laboratory
experiments to research in law and economics).
88. William Boyd et al., Law, Environment, and the “Nondismal” Social Sciences, 8 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 183, 184 (2016).
89. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 52, at 658.
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coding are the qualitative judgments supporting the coding choices. Authors
conducting Category B1 studies of environmental law most frequently use data
from judicial decisions. These studies also analyze regulations and state and
federal statutes, but they rarely use other agency decision documents.
Professor Jason Czarnezki’s 2008 study of the Chevron Doctrine as
applied in environmental law cases is a clear example of a typical coding
analysis of government decisions.90 He examined three years of U.S. Court of
Appeals environmental law cases and coded them for several criteria, including
Chevron deference and outcome for the EPA, to address questions about
judicial review of agency interpretation of environmental law.91 Stein’s 2010
study of environmental impact statements issued for energy exploration
activities is an example of a rare qualitative analysis of these types of agency
documents92—a somewhat surprising result, given the wealth of data available
in these environmental analyses. Though other articles dealt with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as a subject of litigation,93 only one other
article grappled with the content of environmental impact statements.94
Another example of coding agency documents in order to engage in
quantitative analysis examined biological opinions required by the ESA.95
Owen assessed how the documents implemented a statutory duty to protect
critical habitat from adverse modification. While Owen’s study reported the
service biologists’ jeopardy, adverse modification, and take findings in
biological opinions, his article did not include after-the-fact data measurements
from the real world as a Category B2 article would. He did, however, fine tune
his conclusions based on Category A2 interviews.
To count as an analysis of government decisions, Category B1 articles
must analyze the content of the government decision, not merely whether a
decision was made. As with all of our categories, there are difficult judgment
calls in placing an article that seems to straddle boundaries. For instance,
Professor Lesley McAllister’s Enforcing Cap-and-Trade: A Tale of Two
Programs comfortably fits in Category A1 as a case study.96 However, it fails
to qualify in Category B1 because, even though she counted notices of
90. Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory
Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767 (2008).
91. Id. at 786–87.
92. Stein, supra note 42, at 500–17.
93. See, e.g., David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the
Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 57–65 (2012) (examining all
climate change litigation matters filed in 2010 and 2011).
94. See John Ruple & Mark Capone, NEPA, FLPMA, and Impact Reduction: An Empirical
Assessment of BLM Resource Management Planning and NEPA in the Mountain West, 46 ENVTL. L.
953 (2016) (reviewing sixteen environmental impact statements that underwent revisions by the Bureau
of Land Management).
95. Owen, supra note 74, at 165.
96. Lesley K. McAllister, Enforcing Cap-and-Trade: A Tale of Two Programs, 2 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1 (2010) (comparing the Acid Rain and Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
programs).
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violation and tracked the reason for their being issued, she did not categorize
content through coding. Similarly, we excluded Professors Victor Flatt and
Paul Collins’s environmental enforcement research from Category B1 because
the authors only tallied government-issued penalties.97 They did not analyze
government decision-making documents and make categorization decisions
based on the contents. The article is, nonetheless, an excellent example of
empirical environmental law research employing quasi-experimental tools
(Category B3). In contrast, Professors David Caudill and Donald Curley’s case
study codes rather than counts the arguments in the public record in order to
examine how stakeholders criticize water-quality decisions relating to impaired
waters surrounding Philadelphia.98 It therefore qualifies as Categories A1 and
B1. Category B1 articles may include some simple descriptive statistics, such
as mean, standard deviation, frequency, or proportion. Any statistical analysis
that attempts to control for confounding variables would also be classified as a
controlled observational or quasi-experimental study (Category B3).
5. Category B2: Quantitative Analysis of Data Other than Government
Decisions
These studies undertake quantitative analysis of environmental or
socioeconomic data to test the effects of a policy or other legal decision making
on the “real” world. Category B2 studies ranged from assessments of whether
hazardous waste facility siting was racially based99 (a particularly hot topic in
the 1990s) to western water market structure.100 We classified articles as
Category B2 if they used any statistical technique, from simple descriptive
statistics to univariate or bivariate analysis, as long as the analysis examined
actual environmental or social data—not simply information contained in a
legal document. We consider data from permit reporting requirements (as
opposed to the permits themselves, which are government decisions) as B2eligible data, which we coded as facility characteristics in Table 3. For
example, Professors Robert Glicksman and Dietrich Earnhart’s study of
environmental performance falls in Category B2 because it employed discharge
levels reported as part of permit compliance to address the effectiveness of
enforcement interventions.101 Table 3 tallies the numbers of articles using

97. Victor B. Flatt & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire Straits: There Is No
Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55, 73 (2009).
98. Caudill & Curley, supra note 54, at 264–65. In supplementing the public record by
interviewing stakeholders, the study also falls into Category A2. Id. at 262–63.
99. See, e.g., Lambert & Boerner, supra note 63, at 204 (analyzing the demographic
characteristics of the population surrounding hazardous waste facilities).
100. Kristiana Hansen et al., An Econometric Test of Water Market Structure in the Western United
States, 55 NAT. RESOURCES J. 127 (2014).
101. Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, Effectiveness of Government Interventions at
Inducing Better Environmental Performance: Does Effectiveness Depend on Facility or Firm Features?,
35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479, 495–96 (2008).

44.4 FISCHMAN V2 FOR JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

790

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

4/3/18 1:03 PM

[Vol. 44:767

different types of nonlegal data, which included census reports, hazardous
waste facility information, industrial effluent data, and land-use records.
6. Category B3: Controlled Observational or Quasi-Experimental Studies
Category B3 articles are “[m]ore sophisticated designs—controlled
observational or quasi-experimental studies using multivariate regression
techniques” to “control for confounding variables.”102 Because much
environmental law research investigates the effect of a new rule, quasiexperimental studies can illuminate why something measurable (e.g., asthmarelated hospital admissions) changed after the new rule took effect. Quasiexperimental methods must be applied opportunistically whenever nature,
politics, or an accident creates some difference where there formerly was
none.103 The “pre/post analysis” version of Category B3 simply compares
outcomes before a new rule with those after.104 Though exogenous
environmental changes may also occur in the time frame, multivariate
regression analyses may be employed to identify and separate out some effects
that are not due to the rule change.105 A famous example of this kind of
opportunistic quasi-experiment debunked a long-assumed association of
reduced energy consumption and daylight saving time (DST). When Indiana
moved from using DST for some of its counties to imposing DST for most of
its counties in 2006, Professors Matthew Kotchen and Laura Grant compared
the electricity consumption of different counties over the transition period.106
For legal regimes that vary by state, comparing relevant data across
jurisdictions can also yield quasi-experimental evidence about effects much as
comparing counties new to DST with those that had long used DST helped
show the energy consumption effects. This is a commonly employed tool in
other areas of law,107 such as torts, where federal uniformity is weak.
We limited coding for this category to studies that employed analyses to
enhance the accuracy of their study by controlling for confounding variables.
For example, though a close call, we did not include Professor David
Uhlmann’s Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime in Category B3
because he did not report results of regression and correlation models.108 He
indicated that he performed the analyses but rejected them as inadequate to
102. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 52, at 659.
103. Greenstone & Gayer, supra note 34, at 31.
104. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 52, at 652, 659.
105. Id. at 660.
106. Matthew J. Kotchen & Laura E. Grant, Does Daylight Saving Time Save Energy? Evidence
from a Natural Experiment in Indiana, 93 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 1172, 1173 (2011) (finding that
though saving time saves on electricity used for lighting, it prompts increases for heating and cooling).
107. E.g., Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil
Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1132 (2002) (describing the prevalence of controlled
observational and quasi-experimental methods in law and economics).
108. David M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 159 (2014).
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explain the relationship among aggravating factors in environmental
prosecutions.109 Despite our stringent coding practice, more articles employed
this method than any other one. One reason may be the influence that
economics has had on empirical legal scholarship—quasi-experimental
techniques are common in economics literature.110
The Category B3 articles may include data from any of the other
categories, and also fit the “uses statistics” requirement of the more restrictive
definitions of an empirical study.111 Researchers frequently used real-world, B2
data as the basis for testing the effects of environmental laws and policies, so
many articles (44 percent) fell into both Category B2 and Category B3 (Table
6). For instance, Professor Vicki Been et al. drew conclusions from a
descriptive statistical analysis of New York City zoning decisions by analyzing
city services, housing market, homeownership, voting, income, and racial
demographic variables (Category B2).112 The authors also conducted a
multivariate regression to disprove the hypothesis that local voters are more
powerful than real estate developers in suburbs as compared to cities when it
comes to rezoning (Category B3 and hypothesis testing article).113 Other
Category B2 and B3 articles used facility-level data from the Toxic Release
Inventory to assess the effectiveness of voluntary EPA pollution control
programs,114 or a combination of demographic and environmental data to
assess the effects of state environmental standard-setting.115 Professor Richard
Revesz’s rigorous 1997 study of the influence of political ideology on judicial
decision making in environmental cases is by far the most highly cited article in
our study, and a clear example of both a Category B1 and Category B3
approach.116
A few Category B3 articles do not employ data from any other category.
Professors Howard Chang and Hilary Sigman interrogated data on cost
recovery shares from the EPA’s accounting databases related to the

109. Id. at 204 n.164.
110. See, e.g., Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the
Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27 (2003) (a widely cited study documenting that the
proximity of timberlands to known endangered owl locations corresponds to earlier timber harvesting).
111. See George, supra note 1, at 147 (determining empirical legal scholarship using statistical
phrases such as “statistical significance” and “quantitative”).
112. Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth
Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227, 252–54 (2014).
113. Id. at 259.
114. See Robert Innes & Abdoul G. Sam, Voluntary Pollution Reductions and the Enforcement of
Environmental Law: An Empirical Study of the 33/50 Program, 51 J.L. & ECON. 271, 276–81 (2008);
Toffel & Short, supra note 49, at 620.
115. See Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality
Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting,
8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 66 (1998).
116. Revesz, supra note 13.
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Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.117
They tested the theory that the government would recover more in actions
under joint and several liability than it would under individually apportioned
liability.118 We did not count the information taken from the EPA databases as
falling into Category B1 because the authors did not code or qualitatively
analyze a government decision; instead, the authors used the quantity of money
recorded in the database as having been recovered by a government
decision.119 The article did not fall into category B2 because the quantity of a
financial penalty did not meet our definition of nonlegal data. It is one of the
only four clear Category B3 articles that did not fall within the scope of any of
our other categories.
III. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Our most important result is that only a small number of articles can fairly
be characterized as part of the rigorous, new empirical law movement. The
seventy-three articles we identified as meeting both our empirical and
environmental law definitions are a drop in the bucket of each of those
categories. Overall, law journals publish between four hundred and five
hundred environmental law articles each year.120 Though it is not as
straightforward to estimate what proportion of empirical law scholarship the
seventy-three articles constitute, Diamond and Mueller, employing a definition
for “empirical” similar to our study, estimated that nearly half of all law review
articles included some empirical content.121 By that rough measure,
environmental law scholarship underperforms in empirical research relative to
legal scholarship on the whole. However, as we discussed in the beginning of
Part II, our narrow search scope undercounts empirical research that does not
label itself as such or employ conventional methods of presenting data.
Could the culture of environmental law scholarship have limited
researchers? Michael Faure suggests that environmental lawyers do not use
available data on the effectiveness of environmental laws because the results of
that research are not published in journals tailored to lawyers.122 However, we
have no reason to believe that the culture of environmental law is any more
parochial than other fields that have embraced empirical research more readily.
Instead, a closer look at the published empirical scholarship and characteristics
of environmental law may offer some hints to explain the relatively low
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012); Howard F. Chang & Hilary Sigman, An Empirical Analysis
of Cost Recovery in Superfund Cases: Implications for Brownfields and Joint and Several Liability, 11 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477 (2014).
118. Chang & Sigman, supra note 117, at 501–02.
119. Id. at 483–85.
120. Breggin et al., supra note 19.
121. Diamond & Mueller, supra note 4.
122. Michael Faure, Effectiveness of Environmental Law: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 36
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 293, 295 (2012).
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proportion of empirical studies. This does not mean that environmental
scholarship has too few empirical studies relative to other fields, many of
which may have an even smaller proportion of published empirical work. The
relatively small sample size of the published empirical environmental law
scholarship counsels caution in drawing too may conclusions about what is
distinctive about empirical environmental law based solely on the coding of the
articles. Yet, we can offer additional observations about our results despite the
limitations in our search method, which required that articles self-identify as
“empirical” and excluded several studies that otherwise fall within an empirical
framework.
A. Describing the Legal Landscape
In their survey of environmental law professors, Owen and Professor
Caroline Noblet found that their subjects who engage in interdisciplinary
research do so because they “hope to make their work more practical and
useful.”123 Empirical approaches typically emerge from interdisciplinary
academic work but could be used by non-scholars, such as advocates, agency
officials, and legislators.124 The scope of environmental law and the range of
disciplinary approaches, mostly borrowed from the social sciences, preclude
detailed recommendations of study designs for particular statutory programs or
common dispute categories. However, we can venture some suggestions for
empirical research agendas to inform and test common approaches to
environmental law.125
As with most fields of legal scholarship, environmental law articles are
often normative, argumentative, or theoretical.126 While employing some
positive presumptions about the world, such claims are often peripheral to the
central point of the article. Our least controversial suggestion is that articles
that are mostly about positive law, such as ones that identify a dominant type of
a rule,127 should employ more empirical methods. Environmental law
scholarship encompasses a diverse range of methods.128 Good scholarship

123. Dave Owen & Caroline Noblet, Interdisciplinary Research and Environmental Law, 41
ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 891 (2014).
124. Id. at 918–19.
125. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1043 (explaining three aims of empirical work: describe the
contours of law as implemented by the government (including judicial interpretations); understand
causal connections; and evaluate the merits of reform proposals).
126. Compare John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L. Q. 233,
234–36 (1990) (argumentative), with Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting
Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347, 430
(1998) (normative), with Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms:
A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981 (1994) (theoretical).
127. See, e.g., Peter A. Appel, Wilderness, the Courts, and the Effect of Politics on Judicial
Decisionmaking, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 277–78 (2011).
128. Fisher et al., supra note 3, at 231–34.
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employs methods well-tailored to answer questions posed.129 Empiricism is, at
its core, about bringing rigor to assertions describing the world. Therefore,
descriptive scholarship is an area where greater reliance on systematic,
quantitative methods would yield rewards.
Doctrinal analysis has always sought to describe the law, usually as
implemented by courts. Empirical research can augment doctrinal legal
scholarship by providing a finer grained, quantitative analysis of relevant cases.
Of particular interest are empirical studies that question the descriptive
accuracy of generally accepted “black letter law.”130 For instance, Professor
Peter Appel’s analysis of judicial ideology and Wilderness Act decisions131
contradicted the conventional wisdom that liberal judges favor more
environmental protection and conservative judges less.132 He found that the
decisions overall had a pro-wilderness bent that defied predictions based on the
traditional legal or attitudinal models of judicial review.133 Though doctrinal
scholarship will continue to generate important explanations and critiques of
court and agency reasoning, empirical scholarship will illuminate how
important such reasoning is to outcomes. Often, legal scholarship gravitates
toward unusual case outcomes or novel reasoning. These phenomena are
important and often point the way toward reform. However, they can present a
deceptive picture of how courts and agencies typically work through
adjudication. For instance, Professors James Krier and Stewart Sterk contrasted
the dominant doctrinal descriptions of takings law as defined by the U.S.
Supreme Court with the positive finding that the vast majority of judicial
adjudications fail to rely on those doctrines.134 Instead, most courts generally
provide “less protection than the Court insists they must. When regulation is at
issue, state courts, like the Supreme Court, appear content to leave local
officials accountable to voters, not to judges.”135 In this manner, systematic,
quantitative analysis can improve the accuracy of doctrinal research.
Even purely descriptive empirical research can help pinpoint whether
environmental law makes a difference in the quality of the ambient
environment. One of us has previous described the Whiggish narratives of
“progress” toward the present that often accompany agency reports on ambient

129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1044.
131. Appel, supra note 127.
132. See id.; Czarnezki, supra note 90, at 768; Revesz, supra note 13, at 1717–18.
133. Appel, supra note 127. Appel’s conclusions are questioned by Joseph M. Feller, Have Judges
Gone Wild? Plaintiffs’ Choices and Success Rates in Litigation against Federal Administrative
Agencies, 44 ENVTL. L. 287, 289–93 (2014).
134. Krier & Sterk, supra note 36, at 40 (concluding that Supreme Court doctrine “supports
property rights with rhetoric of symbolic importance but little, if any, operational significance”).
135. Id. at 94.
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environmental quality.136 For instance, the 1989 Council on Environmental
Quality annual report boasted that
the experience of the past two decades . . . suggests that Americans in 2010
will respond to environmental problems with energy, creativity, and a deepseated sense of responsibility for future generations. Americans believe
strongly that environmental quality is an essential component of their longterm health and economic prosperity. They have demonstrated that they
have the will to protect environmental quality and the capacity to act. The
lessons of the past 20 years can give all Americans hope for the future.137
These narratives often emphasize decreases in pollution emissions, but
may not link them to ambient or exposure measures. Changes in ambient
environmental quality or exposure may be prompted more by economic and
meteorological cycles than by environmental law. Available data may limit the
ability of empirical research to tease out the relationship between
implementation of environmental law (measured outputs) and environmental
quality (outcomes, or “measures of merit”). This is one reason to perform
randomized field experiments,138 though they may not be feasible for
answering many questions in environmental law.
Until researchers collect better data, existing sources may provide some
insights. Environmental law scholars can build on the already strong presence
of quasi-experimental approaches we found in the existing literature.
Regression analysis to support causal inferences is of special concern in this
method of research.139 A major contribution to environmental law would be to
gather data, some readily available—such as the timeline of Title V Clean Air
Act permits from draft to finalization140 or site closure documents141—and test
causes of delay. Our findings suggest that environmental law scholars are adept
at interrogating existing data to look for causal patterns. Refining these
methods, as described below, would provide a more credible map to the factors
that correspond with environmental law successes and failures.

136. Robert L. Fischman, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered Species Act, 34
ENVTL. L. 451, 469 (2004) (“The Whig narratives generally follow the same outline: Dramatic
environmental degradation (e.g., flaming rivers, oil-slicked beaches, killer smog) led to governmental
action that abated the worst offenders.”).
137. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 13 (1989).
138. See Green & Thorley, supra note 76, at 54–56.
139. See generally Epstein & King, supra note 11 (providing a primer on empirical research design
and implications as applied to legal scholarship).
140. Such information can often be accessed on government websites. See, e.g., Region 5
Electronic Permits, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/caa-permitting/region-5-electronic-permits#mipermits
(last updated June 13, 2017).
141. Such information can often be accessed on government websites. See, e.g., Virtual File
Cabinet, IND. DEP’T OF ENVTL. MGMT., http: http://vfc.idem.in.gov/DocumentSearch.aspx (last visited
Feb. 20, 2017).
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B. Existing Data (Category B)
Without readily accessible, relevant databases, environmental law scholars
are left to build their own datasets, a daunting proposition, or be more creative
about what existing data may suggest indirectly. Most of the published
empirical environmental studies analyze existing data (Table 5). Existing legal
databases, such as Westlaw and Lexis, continue to grow in scope and remain
important sources.142 Many critical sources of existing data reside in
government documents spread across multiple agencies with varying
recordkeeping practices and search algorithms. Some, such as permits, contain
excellent proxy measures for pollution control, and are discussed below.
Others, such as environmental analyses in NEPA143 and ESA144 documents,
contain rich details about the ambient environment and effects of the full range
of human interventions. Canvassing those effects and methods of mitigating
environmental damage by systematically organizing the content holds promise
as a project that could expand the empirical dimension of legal document
coding.
For example, Professor John Ruple and Mark Capone dug into draft, final,
and supplemental environmental impact statements to extract surprisingly finegrained information.145 The information allowed for exploratory data analysis
not just of environmental impacts of resource management decisions but also
estimates of jobs created and air emissions that would result from alternative
management options.146 More impressive still, they were able to document
elusive effects of various kinds of NEPA compliance, such as the connection
between accelerated completion schedules for draft environmental statements
and the need for supplemental statements.147 Though NEPA is nearly fifty
years old, their work is path-breaking. It illustrates how relatively simple
research designs can contribute to better understanding of laws whose impacts
have long been the subject of speculation.148
Environmental law can learn from the efforts of other specialties to make
data available for researchers. Civil procedure scholars have long made use of
the federal Public Access to Court Electronic Records website.149 It collects
case filings and docket information but may be prohibitively expensive for
researchers outside of the Federal Judicial Center.150 Some legal fields employ
142. See, e.g., Appel, supra note 127, at 294.
143. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(f) (2012).
144. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1541 (2012).
145. Ruple & Capone, supra note 94.
146. Id. at 972–73.
147. Id. at 962.
148. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239
(1973).
149. PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS, https://www.pacer.gov/ (last visited Sept.
30, 2017).
150. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, https://www.fjc.gov/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). The Federal
Judicial Center publishes empirical research based on the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
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data curated by public agencies. For instance, criminal law empirical research
mines FBI crime statistics,151 the U.S. Sentencing Commission datasets,152 and
the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse,153 which collects information
from federal law enforcement generally through Freedom of Information Act154
requests. A similar, searchable database containing content from all NEPA and
ESA analyses would fertilize empirical analysis.
Other law fields that are further ahead in commitment to empirical
research have consortia that collect their own data and provide it to researchers.
These efforts to build databases represent a tremendous investment of time and
money to sustain a scholarly agenda founded on quantitative analysis. For
instance, the Consumer Bankruptcy Project has compiled its own, very
productive, proprietary database from court files, supplemented by written
questionnaires completed by debtors.155 Co-investigators divide responsibilities
for data collection and then obtain access to the entire database. Important
findings have emerged as a result.156 The Stanford Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse collects detailed information about prosecution, defense, and
settlement of federal class action securities fraud litigation.157 Some progress is
evident in compiling environmental compliance databases, but they have yet to
play as important a role in environmental law scholarship.158 An advantage to
pooling information into shared databases (besides relieving researchers of
reinventing the laborious assembling process for each study) is that it promotes
database. See, e.g., EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2008), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files
/2012/CAFA0408.pdf. Judge Posner advocates for more empirical studies using data from the
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND
THE JUDICIARY 275 (2016).
151. Uniform Crime Reporting, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/ (last visited
Sept. 30, 2017).
152. Interactive Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
http://isb.ussc.gov/Login (last visited Oct. 25, 2017).
153. About Us, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/
aboutTRACgeneral.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).
154. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
155. See Katherine Porter, Appendix: Methodology of the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, in
BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 235, 235–44 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012)
(explaining the methods for the 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2007 iterations of the Consumer Bankruptcy
Project).
156. See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless et. al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of
Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 385 (2008) (explaining the decline in bankruptcy filings
that strongly suggested 2005 legislation failed to meet its principal goal of reducing the number of canpay debtors).
157. About Us, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://securities.stanford.edu/about-the-scac.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).
158. Mark A. Cohen, Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Policy, in INTERNATIONAL
YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 1999/2000: A SURVEY OF CURRENT
ISSUES 44 (Henk Folmer & Tom Tietenberg eds., 1999) (cited by Vandenbergh, supra note 5, at 139
n.307 (illustrating how the challenge of gathering and analyzing environmental compliance data may
be overcome)).
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repeated investigations and iterative sharpening of analytical tools and
understanding. Empirical environmental law scholarship seldom probes the
same database multiple times with different perspectives. Other fields gain
insights by fine-tuning studies as new problems and promising methods of
analysis emerge from prior studies.
Our study examined many articles that employed existing databases to
persuasive effect, but the frustrating truth is that environmental data are far less
easily available than economic information. For antitrust, contract, and
corporate law, economic questions are central to legal objectives. However,
economic data only go so far in measuring environmental law objectives, such
as promoting “public health and welfare”159 or conserving ecosystems upon
which imperiled species depend.160 When ultimate values cannot be directly or
easily measured, empirical research relies on proxy variables to indicate how
well objectives have been fulfilled. The relationship between the proxies and
the ultimate objectives may be “vague and under-theorized.”161 Linking the
two is critical to produce empirical research that realizes the potential benefits
supporting this trend in legal scholarship.
In some cases, such as data on effluent discharges under pollution control
permits, the proxy measures may be good indicators of ultimate goals.162 Still,
only seventeen of the thirty-two Category B2 (quantitative analysis of nonlegal
data) articles examined data on the physical environment. The articles were
split almost evenly between land-use and natural resources issues, and pollution
control issues. The relatively large proportion of empirical environmental law
studies that employed quasi-experimental techniques (52 percent of the articles
in our study) to wring insights from existing data suggests that there are a fair
number of researchers adept with those statistical tools to make the most of
newly compiled datasets.
Even better information about environmental quality will be of limited
general use except in those instances where quasi-experimental designs can
overcome synergistic effects. Mello and Zeiler recommend addressing these
issues in health law through fixed-effects or difference-in-difference models.163
But those sophisticated tools may be difficult to employ in most situations and
beyond the skills of many environmental law scholars. Collaboration with
scholars skilled in other fields and techniques offers enormous potential for
overcoming the design challenges. Other authors have recommended that
environmental law scholars advance interdisciplinary partnerships by
developing “interactional expertise with other disciplines (both scientific and
social scientific) so that . . . legal scholarship is based on a sound understanding

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012).
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).
Fischman, supra note 45, at 130.
E.g., Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 101, at 484.
Mello & Zeiler, supra note 52, at 665.
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of environmental problems.”164 Collaboration should be a two-way street to
ensure that environmental law scholarship does not blindly accept unexamined
assumptions of other disciplines. In addition to other scholars, some public
entities, such as the EPA’s National Center for Environmental Research, may
engage in specific projects to generate data exploring synergistic effects, but
they seldom focus on legal issues.165
The outcomes we coded as Category B3 illustrate what is possible with
quasi-experimental methods. For instance, Professors Cary Coglianese and
Jennifer Nash employed multivariate regression analysis to untangle the
relationship between enrollment in a special program to go beyond regulatory
pollution control requirements and real reductions in pollutant emissions.166
Comparing states with similar demographics but different environmental laws
is probably the best target for quasi-experimental studies to explore how the
variance in the “treatment” (laws) may lead to different outcomes.167 Even
here, though, the technical challenges of fixed-effect or difference-in-difference
analysis will often require legal scholars to partner with researchers from other
fields.
The rise of “big data” may drive a substantial shift in the information both
agencies and scholars rely upon in reaching conclusions. Big data refers not
only to the increase in volume and speed of acquisition of data accessible
through the internet—it also refers to collecting in one place a variety of inputs,
such as ambient chemical concentrations, water flows, biological observations,
and farming practices in watershed modeling.168 Big data embraces “new
techniques in data analytics and new infrastructures for translating those data
into governmental policy and practice. . . . [O]ver the next fifteen years or so
big data will drive a major shift in the underlying knowledge practices of
environmental law.”169 The EPA views these new tools as transforming how it
gathers data and conducts analysis. It expects to employ “[b]usiness
intelligence tools, geospatial tools and visualization tools” for “insight from
disparate data sources.”170 Though Professor William Boyd speculates that

164. Fisher et al., supra note 3, at 232.
165. About the National Center for Environmental Research (NCER), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
aboutepa/about-national-center-environmental-research-ncer (last updated July 20, 2017). One example
of a rare contribution to the legal literature is cited by Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 55, at 321 n.13
(citing NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. RESEARCH, Corporate Environmental Performance and the
Effectiveness of Government Interventions, EPA, https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncer_abstracts/index.cfm/
fuseaction/display.rfatext/rfa_id/135 (last updated Apr. 10, 2000)).
166. Coglianese & Nash, supra note 23, at 44–48.
167. See, e.g., Kotchen & Grant, supra note 106 (finding that saving time reduces electricity used
for lighting, but it prompts increases for heating and cooling).
168. Stephen Harper, Big Data’s Big Handprint, ENVTL. FORUM, Mar.–Apr. 2017, at 23.
169. William Boyd, Environmental Law, Big Data, and the Torrent of Singularities, 64 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 544, 546–47 (2016).
170. EPA’s Cross-Agency Data Analytics and Visualization Program, SEMANTIC COMMUNITY,
http://semanticommunity.info/Data_Science/Data_Science_for_EPA_Big_Data_Analytics#EPA.E2.80.9
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such a turn toward big data will increase reliance on opaque algorithms, it
seems certain to open up new sources of information and new methods of
analysis to scholars.171 On the other hand, the presidential transition in 2017
illustrated the vulnerability of big data sources maintained by public agencies.
As the Trump Administration removed or limited access to existing databases,
researchers encountered difficulty capturing the information lurking behind
proprietary interface code.172 Though the internet made government
information more widely available, it also made data vulnerable to centralized
decisions to modify or obstruct it from public view.
Owen offers especially helpful suggestions for how spatial analysis can
improve environmental law scholarship.173 Quasi-experiments could employ
geospatial tools to analyze how law affects development patterns in different
areas subject to different legal regimes.174 They could also examine land-use
changes before and after regulatory interventions. Few legal researchers have
the expertise to engage in such studies by themselves. However, collaborations
already exist for such studies, and need perspectives to better address policy
concerns. Owen explains:
While an economist’s perspective has obvious value, there are ways in
which lawyers could contribute to this sort of work. Environmental lawyers
may not be trained in quantitative analysis or GIS [geographic information
systems], but they are taught to understand, at least at a qualitative level,
how particular regulatory provisions fit within broader environmental law
systems, how environmental law evolves and changes, what roles
environmental law assigns to different actors, and how different institutions
tend to respond to their roles. That legal perspective could help
interdisciplinary research teams identify important research questions,
develop hypotheses, flag potentially confounding variables, and interpret
results.175
Beyond spatial data, environmental modeling generally suffers from
relatively weak understandings of how the law operates to mediate the
relationship between human and natural systems.176 Environmental law
scholars can both improve literature outside of law journals in this way and also
return to legal scholarship to explain “how legal rules might generate
9s_Cross-Agency_Data_Analytics_and_Visualization_Program (last updated May 2, 2017) (quoted in
Boyd, supra note 169, at 552).
171. Boyd, supra note 169, at 565–68.
172. Amy Harmon, Activists Rush to Save Government Science Data—If They Can Find It, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2017, at D1, D3.
173. Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH
L. REV. 219, 227–81 (2013).
174. E.g., Been et al., supra note 112, 247–50.
175. Owen, supra note 173, at 279.
176. Id.; see, e.g., William Blomquist & Elinor Ostrom, Deliberation, Learning, and Institutional
Change: The Evolution of Institutions in Judicial Settings, 19 CONST. POL. ECON. 180, 188–96 (2008)
(discussing, without the nuance of legal analysis, the role of adjudication in shaping institutions charged
with natural resources management).

44.4 FISCHMAN V2 FOR JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

EMPIRICAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCHOLARSHIP

4/3/18 1:03 PM

801

environmental consequences and . . . how environmental change generates
legal responses.”177
C. New Data (Category A)
Generating new data through anything other than coding legal documents
was far less common in empirical environmental law scholarship than the use
of existing data. This probably reflects the expense and unfamiliarity with data
generation methods in the legal academy. Categories A1 and A2 are well
matched to conventional environmental law approaches to scholarship. We
expect these methods to grow in empirical rigor as legal researchers turn to
quantitative techniques for enhancing qualitative case studies and interviewbased descriptions.178 In this manner, a small change in adopting quantitative
techniques can transform existing conventional scholarship into empirical
contributions.179
In particular, a well-designed survey can constitute a kind of experiment
probative of correlations between law and effects if the samples and treatments
are truly random.180 Particularly where general public attitudes are relevant,
inexpensive survey tools, such as Amazon’s “Mechanical Turk,” can support a
wide range of research.181 Surveys can help gauge how law might cause a
person to change attitudes or behaviors. Most of the survey methods in
empirical environmental law focus not on the public generally but on particular
roles, such as the corporate manager or the agency enforcement attorney.
Besides selection bias, the danger in relying on such surveys for assertions
about the role of laws or procedures is that respondents may want to convey a
viewpoint at odds with actual behavior.
Experiments allow researchers to limit sources of variation that may
impact dependent variables by random assignments of treatment. Controlling
for dependent variables can be difficult where they are hard to measure. For
example, understanding the influence of critical habitat designation in recovery
of endangered species by analyzing just the designations and recoveries would
be frustrated by many dependent variables having to do with differences
between species, their habitats, and the demographic contexts of their locations.
Though difficult to pull off, valid experiments yield the most probative test of
causal relationships by minimizing the inferential problems that limit the
usefulness of many surveys and existing databases. We found experimental
177. Owen, supra note 173, at 279.
178. See generally Mintz, supra note 27, at 10,391 (using interviews to analyze changes in EPA
enforcement approaches).
179. See, e.g., Ackerman et al., supra note 58, at 1227–29 (empirical analysis of attempts to control
pollution in Delaware River); Fred O. Boadu et al., supra note 59, at 117–20 (empirical analysis of
institutional change to manage an aquifer).
180. Chilton & Tingley, supra note 68, at 178.
181. Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research:
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351 (2012).
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designs completely absent from empirical environmental law. Others have
found experimental designs absent from empirical health law and international
law scholarship.182 As with international law, federal environmental law may
lack enough variation to make quasi-experimental observations useful. On the
temporal level, infrequent events, such as extinctions or major releases of toxic
substances, may also frustrate quasi-experimental attempts to determine
causative relationships. Though experiments are likely to be the most expensive
type of empirical method, they may nonetheless steer agencies away from even
more expensive mistakes, and could help agency decisions better withstand
judicial review.183 This is particularly true where the agency is employing
assumptions in drawn-out rule makings applicable to large numbers of
regulated entities, where getting the incentives right the first time is crucial.
Models for experimental designs from other fields could be adapted to
environmental law.184 Laboratory experiments in the social sciences frequently
generate useful data because of the precise control that can be exercised over
the dependent variables. For example, a laboratory can randomly expose people
to different scripts or videos, only some of which would address an
environmental law issue. If the researchers then asked the subjects their
preferences about the issue, then the correlations would not be confounded by
self-selected awareness of the issues. In examining decision making (e.g.,
energy conservation) in response to stimuli (e.g., awareness of environmental
impacts or incentives), experiments can measure the responses and identify
factors that account for differences.185
Of course, the artificial setting of a laboratory may fail to capture relevant
signals in the context of real-world decision making. Field experiments are
useful because they occur in the relevant environment where subjects actually
make choices. The tradeoff is simply that investigator control is more limited
than in the laboratory. However, if environmental scholars want to know how
inspections affect pollution emissions, the best setting would be to observe the
effects in the field, based on a random assignment of inspectors. In natural
resources law, agencies already employ field experiments through adaptive
management in situations of great uncertainty. In adaptive management,

182. See Mello & Zeiler, supra note 52, at 660 (finding no experimental designs in empirical health
law scholarship); Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal
Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–5 (2012) (finding no experimental designs in empirical
international law scholarship).
183. We categorize the analysis of disparate state approaches to environmental law to be quasiexperiments.
184. We have adapted the ideas for experimental international law offered by Chilton & Tingley,
supra note 68, at 222–34.
185. See, e.g., Shahzeen Z. Attari et al., Energy Conservation Goals: What People Adopt, What
They Recommend, and Why, 11 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 342, 343–50 (2016).
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government action itself constitutes the experiment.186 Adaptive management
employs an iterative cycle of setting goals, devising experimental treatments,
monitoring the effects of the treatments, and modifying the treatments in
reaction to the effects observed. What makes this line of research especially
important is that the most challenging problems in environmental law require
actions even in the face of uncertainty—for instance, in the impacts of climate
change on ecological services. Studying the adaptive management experiments
undertaken by agencies creates a field laboratory for understanding both the
results of their experiments and the iterative techniques employed.187 Empirical
legal scholars are already studying this type of governmental experimentation
under the rubric of resilience.188 There are few experiments more important.
Federal resource management agencies have bet the bank on the effectiveness
of adaptive management.189 But monitoring the outcomes of decisions based on
cost-benefit analysis or environmental impact analysis almost always falls short
of what is needed to refine the accuracy of the analytical tools used in the
analyses. A high priority for environmental law must be to build into
implementation the monitoring that can determine whether the models
employed in the front-end analyses accurately predicted outcomes. Generating
such new data as part of a permit, project, or regulation would do more than
any other reform to generate information and better steer environmental law
through empiricism. In addition, scholars can productively turn adaptive
management back on agencies to explore how administrative culture, structure,
and procedure may adapt through learning-by-doing.190 Closer observation and
better design of regulatory adaptation would yield real improvements in
environmental law.
D. Policy Recommendations
Almost half (thirty-five of seventy-three) of the empirical environmental
law articles made specific policy recommendations. For our purposes, policy
includes traditional legal revision of statutes and doctrines as well as regulatory
and administrative changes. This is our most surprising result because the
predominant focus of environmental law research is practical questions of
policy relevance. One reason for the shortfall may be our narrow approach to
coding. To count as a policy recommendation, we required articles to at least

186. As with other empirical insights in legal research, roots of this notion lie in the social sciences.
See, e.g., Donald T. Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, 24 AM. PSYCHOL. 409, 428 (1969) (arguing
that policy reforms should be studied as social experiments).
187. See Fischman & Ruhl, supra note 21, at 273–74.
188. See generally Humby, supra note 25 (analyzing resilience and adaptive governance to better
understand adaptive change).
189. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 24, at 443 (“Since 1993, each of the major federal resource
management agencies has made a policy commitment to employ adaptive management.”).
190. See generally Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in
Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007).
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suggest consideration, if not actually propose, a specific course of legal or
administrative action to address the consequences of some empirical finding.
Therefore, we did not count some articles that offered policy critiques, such as
Coglianese and Nash’s analysis of the EPA’s Performance Track program,
even though it contained a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of a
government program.191 Overall, however, authors were more likely to
recommend further research or offer only observations than to craft and
propose solutions.
In our experience, the norms of legal scholarship generally embrace policy
recommendations, even where they may not be directly or strongly linked to
empirical evidence. In fact, the lack of direct or strong support grounded in
observations is a key criticism of some forms of empirical scholarship.192 It
may well be that the intensive focus on data and quantitative methods
characteristic of empirical environmental law counteracts the typical norms of
environmental law scholarship. Empirical environmental investigations may be
less apt to venture into the speculative art of policy recommendations. The
norm of parsimony rules positive research in science. Outside of legal
scholarship, empirical descriptions that identify new avenues for research are
perfectly adequate justifications for a study. Legal publications should carve
out space for such research, which may be foundational to subsequent, practical
applications. However, to connect with the broader audience of environmental
law scholars, empirical investigators eventually will need to link their work
more clearly to law reform proposals. Designing questions and methods that
succeed in producing probative results will be critical to that success.193
One clue in explaining the relatively small number of empirical
environmental law articles may be a dearth of hypotheses to test. Our results
revealed that forty-one articles out of seventy-three engaged in explicit
hypothesis testing. If, compared to other fields, environmental law lacks
theories with predictive value, then there is relatively little work to be done
with empirical methods. It also means that the theories cannot be applied
confidently in crafting recommendations. Hypothesis testing and policy
recommendations are also related. Policy recommendations require expanding
or generalizing from a narrow, retrospective study to a broad, prospective
proposal. Without a confirmed or refuted hypothesis, it is difficult to extend
research confidently into the realm of policy. Zeiler’s observations about
empirical legal scholarship generally are apt for environmental law:
Empirical validation helps us move from a conversation in the pages of
academic literature to the application of science in the form of evidence191. Coglianese & Nash, supra note 23.
192. Fischman, supra note 45, at 123; see also Kathryn Zeiler, The Future of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: Where Might We Go from Here?, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 78, 81 (2016) (“Likely few would
dispute the claim that the average quality of empirical work published in law reviews lies somewhere
below that of work published in peer-reviewed journals.”).
193. Zeiler, supra note 192.
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based policy. Theory is useful. Theory backed by a single,
methodologically sound empirical study is better. We get closer to the
ideal, however, when the theory we wish to apply is supported by a
collection of methodologically sound empirical studies from a variety of
contexts using a number of different methods and different data samples
drawn from relevant populations. While robust empirical verification
cannot guarantee that some adopted policy will work as intended, it can
help guide us toward policies with the best chance of fulfilling their
promise.194

Professor Elinor Ostrom made a similar point about the importance of
developing “empirically supported” theories.195
The barriers to greater empirical research in environmental law run deep—
into the under-theorized foundations of environmental law.196 Without
sharpening theories, scholars will share less common ground. They will have
fewer hypotheses to test and weaker prescriptions to make. As early as 1981,
Professor Christopher Stone lamented the disconnect between empirical
research in law, heavily influenced by the availability of grants and fashion in
social science, and legal theory in need of testing.197
Therefore, our paradoxical suggestion for improving empirical
contributions to environmental law is more theoretical scholarship to ensure
that empirical investigations can support policy recommendations. Better
predictive theories, combined with fastidious research design to test them, will
yield the greatest improvements in environmental law scholarship seeking to
reform policies. While available databases may tempt empiricists, a study
whose results do not bear on legal effectiveness is not as valuable as one whose
results do. Even where effectiveness studies cannot pinpoint causation, they
may still contribute to the literature by ruling out certain reforms or creating
new hypotheses to be tested in subsequent research. Empirical studies, though,
seldom settle theoretical disputes. Two of the most prominent theories
generating hypotheses tested in the empirical environmental law literature,
environmental racism and race-to-the-bottom federalism, remain stubbornly in
contention.
CONCLUSION
The historian Daniel Boorstin warned that “the great menace to progress is
not ignorance but the illusion of knowledge.”198 In environmental law, untested

194.
195.

Id.
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 25 (1990).
196. By contrast, environmental economics has for generations employed clear, consistent theories
of regulation.
197. Stone, supra note 13, at 1155 (“The data that the rest of law scholarship might need, or even
find useful, do not orient empiricists’ thinking.”).
198. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, CLEOPATRA’S NOSE 7 (1994).
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assumptions result in misspent resources and real menace to human health or
ecological integrity. This undermines public trust in regulatory agencies, which
can result in resource curtailment and further environmental degradation,
thereby complicating the process of appropriately assigning blame and
identifying effective solutions. Spurred on by developments in other legal fields
and integration of social science scholars into law faculties, environmental law
scholarship has made halting progress in employing empirical methods,
particularly in the past decade. Empirical environmental law research can move
scholarship beyond crafting good arguments, the dominant mode of law review
articles, to contributing new knowledge about how law works. Theory will
remain important. Indeed, we speculate that the scarcity of testable theories
stunts the generation of specific law reform proposals. Empirical research
bridges theory and policy recommendations. Recommendations that shape law
reform are the ultimate achievements for practical scholarship. However,
purely descriptive empirical articles remain useful additions to the knowledge
commons, shaping understanding of environmental law.
Though the relative dearth of empirical methods in environmental law
scholarship may reflect challenges in adapting research methods commonly
used in other fields, it says nothing about the value of the existing work. Like
all categories of scholarship, empirical research varies in quality. We expect
that empirical investigations will grow more common in environmental law
research. On the whole, such a development will offer greater opportunities to
improve the effectiveness of environmental law. But misapplication of
statistics, limited rigor of results, and unrepresentative databases may
undermine the ultimate goal of improving scholarly contributions to
environmental law reform. Peer review and other techniques of quality
assurance, including scholarly reviews of the rigor of published studies, will be
needed to optimize the probative value of empirical research. We recommend
that empirical legal scholars collaborate with colleagues in their institution’s
social science departments to improve study design and execution. This crossfertilization would also help empirical law scholarship reach a wider audience
of policy makers who may not use or have access to traditional law journals
and the databases for searching them. It would surely also improve the quality
of legal analysis in the vast nonlegal scholarship that addresses effectiveness of
various environmental governance regimes.
Scholars have long lamented the hurdles to interdisciplinary and empirical
research in legal scholarship.199 However, other legal fields of study have
surmounted those hurdles. We hope that this review of empirical environmental
law starts a discussion among scholars to generate intersecting research
agendas. A collective consideration of the issues involved in empirical research
199. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1351–57 (2002);
David M. Trubek, Comments on the Bok Report: A Strategy for Legal Studies: Getting Bok to Work, 33
J. LEGAL EDUC. 586, 586 (1983).
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may facilitate the vetting of key topics that could benefit the most from
empirical methods. It may promote information sharing and coalesce consortia
that can build new databases. A community of empirical environmental law
investigators could sponsor workshops that improve access to data and the
methods used to wring insights from systematic observations about the
operation of law. The traditional model of a lone legal scholar producing great
articles may be supplemented by a newer model of interdisciplinary teams of
researchers compiling and analyzing information. Teamwork is the norm in
natural science, which is the paradigm of advancing understanding through
empiricism.
This initial attempt to assess the role of empirical research in
environmental law scholarship is but a first step. Subsequent research may
attempt to replicate our findings and monitor scholarly output in subsequent
years to see whether the increase in empirical work of the past decade persists
or grows. Another important topic for future study is to determine whether and
how legal decision makers, such as agency regulators or resource managers,
actually consider empirical scholarship in implementing environmental law.
Finally, we suggest a series of meetings to begin the process of
formulating an agenda for environmental law research. Dissenters or
researchers who simply prefer to work alone can pursue their own course. But
the benefits of establishing a research agenda through dialogue between
professors and others (e.g., agency decision makers) who can make use of
empirical research remain strong. Deliberative discussion may open up new
ideas for testable theories, create database pools, and borrow from empirical
successes in other fields. Teams will be needed to wrestle data into useable
form and tackle design challenges that might otherwise thwart policy-relevant
results. A stronger empirical strand of environmental law scholarship will
strengthen the field by connecting otherwise disparate areas of research. It can
help a notoriously varied hodgepodge of topics cohere into a mature field of
study.

________________________________________________________________
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online
journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu. Responses to articles
may be viewed at our website, http://www.ecologylawquarterly.org.
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